FERC Anti-Manipulation Enforcement and the Barclays Proceeding: What Factors Should Regulated Entities Consider before Deciding to Follow Barclays\u27 Path to Federal Court? by Hale, Matthew
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 7
9-2014
FERC Anti-Manipulation Enforcement and the
Barclays Proceeding: What Factors Should
Regulated Entities Consider before Deciding to
Follow Barclays' Path to Federal Court?
Matthew Hale
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/jece
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the Natural
Resources Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment at Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment by an authorized
editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew Hale, FERC Anti-Manipulation Enforcement and the Barclays Proceeding: What Factors
Should Regulated Entities Consider before Deciding to Follow Barclays' Path to Federal Court?, 6 Wash. &
Lee J. Energy, Climate & Env’t. 198 (2015), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/jece/vol6/
iss1/7
198 
FERC Anti-Manipulation Enforcement 
and the Barclays Proceeding: What 
Factors Should Regulated Entities 
Consider before Deciding to Follow 






Energy regulation is not a new topic, but after the Enron 
scandal, Congress made significant changes. The changes were 
embodied in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. One major change 
was to FERC's ability to hand down penalties for market 
manipulation. Recently, FERC has been aggressively enforcing 
its power and anticipates anti-manipulation enforcement will be 
a point of emphasis in the future. The first entity to 
challenge FERC's power in federal court is Barclays. The 
Barclays case, other recent enforcement actions, and the 
regulations FERC has promulgated provide a guide to regulated 
entities about how and when they should challenge FERC in 
federal court. The outcome of the Barclays case will have an 
immense impact on future FERC enforcement actions. 
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 In 2001, the Enron scandal ripped through California and 
the nation’s economy.1 In the wake of the scandal, questions arose 
about whether agencies like the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) had enough power to keep another Enron 
type manipulation from occurring.2 One area of regulatory law 
that has changed since the Enron scandal is FERC’s authority to 
police and penalize market manipulation.3 
 Congress responded to the market manipulation problem 
with provisions in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct”).4 The 
EPAct included major additions to FERC’s enforcement power.5 It 
granted FERC authority to both regulate market manipulation 
and impose civil penalties on regulated entities it finds 
participated in market manipulation.6 Since the beginning of 
2013, FERC has aggressively enforced its new power and 
                                                             
1.  See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of 
Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1277–78 (2002) (discussing the 
financial implications of Enron’s collapse). 
2.  See id. at 1288 (“Enron shows that the incentive structure that 
motivates actors in our self-regulatory governance system generates much less 
powerful checks against abuse than many observers have believed.”).  
3. See Allan Horwich, Warnings to the Unwary: Multi-
Jurisdictional Federal Enforcement of Manipulation and Deception in the 
Energy Markets after the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 27 ENERGY L.J. 363, 369 
(2006) (discussing the added authority passed in the EPAct of 2005 as a 
response to concerns that arose after the Enron scandal). 
4. See id. (noting the specific law that the U.S. government used 
to respond to the concerns associated with the Enron scandal). 
5.  See id. (“[T]he Energy Policy Act of 2005 . . . granted additional 
enforcement power to the FERC and added to the array of and increased the 
existing civil and criminal penalties for manipulative and deceptive conduct.”). 
6. See 16 U.S.C. § 824v (2014) (prohibiting market manipulation).  
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regulated entities have consented to pay considerable fines.7 
Although Congress created FERC’s power in 2005, Barclays is the 
first to challenge FERC’s anti-manipulation authority in a federal 
court.8  
On July 16, 2013, FERC issued an order assessing a $435 
million fine against Barclays as previously proposed by FERC’s 
Office of Enforcement on October 31, 2013.9 In addition, four 
traders associated with the market manipulation were 
individually fined.10 Barclays refused to pay the fine,11 and FERC 
recently filed an action in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of California asking for an order affirming the 
assessment.12 
 Section II of this Note discusses the history and passage of 
the EPAct.13 Section III of this Note discusses FERC’s 
                                                             
7.  See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, 142 
FERC ¶ 61,056, 1, Docket No. IN12-4, (Jan. 22, 2013) (assessing a civil penalty 
for market manipulation against Deutsche Bank); Order Approving Stipulation 
and Consent Agreement, 142 FERC ¶ 61,088, 1, Docket No. IN10-5, (Feb. 1, 
2013) (assessing a civil penalty for market manipulation against Oceanside 
Power); Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, 142 FERC ¶ 
61,218, 1, Docket No. IN12-11, (Mar. 22, 2013) (assessing a civil penalty for 
market manipulation against Rumford Paper); Order Approving Stipulation and 
Consent Agreement, 142 FERC ¶ 61,041, 1, Docket No. IN11-8 & IN13-5, 
[hereinafter “JP Morgan Consent Agreement”] (July 30, 2013) (assessing a civil 
penalty for market manipulation against JP Morgan). 
8. See Kelly Fetty, Barclays Rejects $453 Million Fine, Takes 
FERC to Court, DIGITAL JOURNAL (Aug. 7, 2013), 
www.digitaljournal.com/article/356023 (discussing the precedential effect of the 
Barclays decision) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
9. See Order Assessing Civil Penalties, Docket No. IN08-8, 144 
FERC ¶ 61,041, 75–76 (July 16, 2013) [hereinafter “Order Assessing Civil 
Penalties”] (accepting Office of Enforcement staff’s recommendation for 
penalties).  
10. See id. (agreeing with the penalties recommended by the Office 
of Enforcement against the individual traders).  
11.  See Petition for an Order Affirming FERC’s July 16, 2013 
Order Assessing Penalties, at 2, FERC v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. CV-02093, 
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (stating that Barclays failed to pay the fine within 60 
days). 
12. See id. (“The Commission now files this petition for an order 
from this Court affirming the Order Assessing Civil Penalties.”).  





promulgation of the anti-manipulation rule.14 Section IV of this 
Note discusses FERC’s recent history of enforcement including its 
considerable fine levied against JP Morgan.15 Section V addresses 
the Barclays enforcement action.16 Section VI analyzes issues 
that may be decided in the pending district court litigation.17 
Section VII of the note analyzes factors regulated entities should 
consider when they determine whether to cooperate with FERC 
or force FERC to litigate in federal court.18 Section VIII concludes 
that when a regulated entity considers a large fine undeserved or 
any amount of fine entirely unwarranted, a regulated entity 
should take FERC to federal court, and when a large fine is 
warranted or a small fine could be reduced to zero, a regulated 
entity should settle with FERC.19 
 
II. History of Energy Policy Act of 2005 
 
 Before the EPAct, FERC’s enforcement authority was 
based on market behavior rules.20 The market behavior rules 
were promulgated in 2003 to combat market-based trading 
activity after the Commission discovered multiple price 
manipulation schemes in California in 2000 and 2001.21 Rule 2 of 
the market behavior rules included a prohibition for “[a]ctions or 
                                                             
14. See infra Part III (outlining FERC’s promulgation of anti-
manipulation rule).  
15. See infra Part IV (explaining FERC’s recent history of 
enforcement in situations similar to Barclay’s).  
16. See infra Part V (discussing Barclays pending enforcement 
action).  
17. See infra Part VI (noting the issues that need to be resolved in 
current district court litigation).  
18. See infra Part VII (elaborating on factors regulated entities 
should consider when conducting business with FERC).  
19. See infra Part VII (discussing recommended actions for 
regulated entities based on potential outcomes).  
20. See Joseph Kelliher, Market Manipulation, Market Power, and 
the Authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 26 ENERGY L.J. 1, 
31 (2005) (“Commission issued the Market Behavior Rules, establishing a 
general prohibition of market manipulation and banning a number of specific 
manipulative practices used by Enron.”). 
21. See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 113 FERC ¶ 
61,067, 61,243 (proposed Oct. 20, 2005) [hereinafter “NOPR”] (to be codified at 
18 C.F.R. pt. 1c.2) (discussing the history and purpose of the market behavioral 
rules). 
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transactions that are without a legitimate business purpose and 
that are intended to or foreseeably could manipulate market 
prices, market conditions, or market rules for electric energy or 
electricity products.”22 However, by 2005, concerns began to grow 
that FERC did not have the necessary tools to regulate its 
markets.23  
 A major driver behind Congressional action and a model of 
what FERC needed was Joseph Kelliher’s 2005 article.24 At the 
time, Kelliher was the Chairman of FERC.25 He outlined three 
important changes needed for FERC to police and penalize 
market manipulation.26 First, Kelliher proposed that FERC must 
have an express authority to prohibit market manipulation that 
did not involve Congress singling out specific instances of market 
manipulation.27 Kelliher wanted FERC to have the ability to 
promulgate rules that generally prohibited market 
manipulation.28 With that power, FERC could promulgate 
regulations prohibiting behavior as quickly as market 
participants came up with more creative ways to get around the 
rules.29 
 Second, Kelliher advocated that FERC have civil and 
criminal penalty authority when its market manipulation rule 
was violated.30 He argued that both securities and commodities 
law had established penalties for their market manipulation 
                                                             
22. Investigation of Terms and Conditions of Public Utility 
Market-Based Rate Authorizations, 105 FERC ¶ 61,218, 62,147 (Nov. 17, 2003).  
23. See Kelliher, supra note 20, at 1 (discussing market changes 
over past 25 years impacting FERC’s ability to regulate effectively). 
24 . See id. at 33 (recommending Congressional action to enhance 
FERC’s abilities to regulate). 
25.  See id. at 1 n.* (stating that Kelliher was the Commissioner of 
FERC).  
26. See id. at 30–31 (discussing three approaches to enhancing 
FERC power to regulate).  
27. See id. at 31 (“It is unlikely that legislatively prohibiting 
specific manipulative practices will prove an effective way to prevent market 
manipulation.”). 
28. See id. (“A better approach would be to establish a general 
prohibition of market manipulation and authorize the Commission to prohibit 
specific manipulative practices.”). 
29. See id. (discussing that market participants normally find 
creative means to circumvent an express Congressional prohibition).  
30. See id. at 30 (advocating that FERC needs the power to impose 




rules.31 With those examples in mind, Kelliher argued no public 
policy rationale existed to support the difference in enforcement 
powers between FERC and other market regulators.32  
Third, Kelliher advocated for FERC to have the ability to 
collect market information.33 He argued that FERC needed the 
ability to collect information on market participants outside of an 
investigation or report for Congress.34 Kelliher argued that 
without power to collect information, FERC would have more 
difficulty adequately regulating markets.35 
 After Kelliher’s article, Congress addressed whether or not 
to enhance FERC’s authority to regulate energy markets. 
Congress included new power for FERC in EPAct.36 However, 
there is very little language in the Congressional Record to 
indicate whether representatives and senators were satisfied 
with the rule. In the House of Representatives, Samuel Farr of 
California stated that the EPAct did not adequately address 
market manipulation concerns.37 However, Senator Bingaman of 
New Mexico believed that consumers benefited from the Act and 
that the bill contained measures that would make markets more 
transparent.38 Senator Bingaman stated that the Act was meant 
                                                             
31. See id. (“Securities and commodities laws include express 
prohibitions of market manipulation.”). 
32. See id. (“There is no valid public policy reason why the 
Commission should not have the same enforcement tools as other federal 
economic regulatory agencies.”).  
33. See id. at 32 (“There is also a need to strengthen the 
Commission’s ability to collect market information on a routine basis from all 
market participants, not just public utilities.”). 
34. See id. (“Under current law, the Commission can obtain 
information only from market participants other than public utilities in the 
course of a specific enforcement investigation, or in the preparation of a report 
to Congress.”).  
35. See id. (arguing that under the then existing scheme FERC 
could not adequately maintain an understanding of developments in the 
market).  
36. See 16 U.S.C. § 824v (2014) (granting FERC power to punish 
market manipulation). 
37. See 151 CONG. REC. H2192-02, H2209, (daily ed. April 20, 
2005) (“The bill does not give federal regulators the tools they need to prevent 
and punish bad actors like Enron who manipulate power markets.”).  
38. See 151 CONG. REC. S9255-01, S9258, (daily ed. July 28, 2005) 
(“The conference report has perhaps some of the strongest provisions in the area 
of protection of energy consumers.”).  
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to prohibit market manipulation.39 Senator Harkin of Iowa also 
stated that the Act was meant to protect consumers but added 
that the Act was directed at actions like those that occurred 
during the Enron scandal.40 
 President George W. Bush signed EPAct into law on 
August 8, 2005.41 The two statutory provisions of note for FERC 
address market manipulation42 and civil penalties.43 The market 
manipulation statute states that:  
 
It shall be unlawful for any entity (including an 
entity described in section 824(f) of this title), 
directly or indirectly, to use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of electric 
energy or the purchase or sale of transmission 
services subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission, any manipulative or deceptive device 
or contrivance (as those terms are used in section 
78j(b) of Title 15), in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe 
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or 
for the protection of electric ratepayers.44 
 
The statute granting civil penalty power to FERC states 
that: 
 
Any person who violates any provision of 
subchapter II of this chapter or any provision of 
any rule or order thereunder shall be subject to a 
                                                             
39.  See id. (stating that the new provisions are broad, ensure 
market transparency, and prohibit market manipulation).  
40. See 151 CONG. REC. S9255-01, S9270, (daily ed. July 28, 2005) 
(“The energy bill includes vitally important measures to boost renewable energy 
and energy efficiency, to improve our electricity grid, and to protect consumers 
from bad corporate actors like Enron.”). 
41. See Statement by the President on Energy Policy Act of 2005, 
2005 WL 1864962 (August 8, 2005) (“Today, I have signed into law H.R. 6, the 
‘Energy Policy Act of 2005.’”).  
42. See 16 U.S.C. § 824v (2014) (granting the power to punish 
market manipulation). 
43. See 16 U.S.C. § 825o-1 (2014) (granting the power to assess 
fines and criminal penalties for market manipulation violations).  




civil penalty of not more than $1,000,000 for each 
day that such violation continues. Such penalty 
shall be assessed by the Commission, after notice 
and opportunity for public hearing, in accordance 
with the same provisions as are applicable under, 
section 823b(d) of this title in the case of civil 
penalties assessed under section 823b of this title. 
In determining the amount of a proposed penalty, 
the Commission shall take into consideration the 
seriousness of the violation and the efforts of such 
person to remedy the violation in a timely 
manner.45 
 
FERC anti-manipulation cases use the procedure outlined 
in the Federal Power Act.46 There are two procedural avenues a 
regulated entity can take when issued an order assessing 
penalties.47 First, the company can elect to go before an 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for a hearing under Section 
31(d)(2).48 If the ALJ affirms the Commission’s proposed penalty, 
the regulated entity has the option to appeal to the appropriate 
United States Court of Appeals who can affirm, modify, or set 
aside the Commission’s order.49 
Second, when a regulated entity is sent notice of a 
proposed penalty under Section 31(d)(1) of the Federal Power Act, 
the entity may elect in writing within 30 days that it wishes to 
skip the agency hearing.50 If the entity chooses to skip the agency 
hearing, FERC will immediately assess civil penalties without an 
agency hearing.51 Under Section 31(d)(3), if the company does not 
                                                             
45.  16 U.S.C. § 825o-1 (2014). 
46. See 16 U.S.C. § 823b(d) (2014) (outlining procedural options 
under the Federal Power Act for anti-manipulation cases). 
47. See id. § 823b(d)(1) (providing for the election to skip the 
administrative proceeding by notifying the agency in writing within 30 days).  
48. See id. § 823b(d)(2)(A) (providing agency proceedings for a 
regulated entity that does not elect to skip agency proceedings).  
49. See id. § 823b(d)(2)(B) (allowing a party unsatisfied with the 
agency proceeding to appeal to the proper Court of Appeal). 
50. See id. § 823b(d)(1) (allowing a regulated entity to “elect in 
writing within 30 days after the date of receipt of such notice to have the 
procedures” avoided in exchange for a Commission assessment.).  
51. See id. § 823b(d)(3)(A) (“[T]he Commission shall promptly 
assess such penalty, by order, after the date of the receipt of the notice . . . .”).  
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pay the penalty FERC orders within 60 days, FERC will file suit 
in a federal district court seeking an affirmance of the 
Commission’s assessed penalty.52 Barclays and its traders elected 
to take this procedural route.53 
 
III. FERC’S Promulgation of the Anti-Manipulation Rule 
 
 After the EPAct was passed, FERC promulgated rules 
implementing the newly enacted statutes.54 FERC used two 
different methods to implement the statute. First, FERC went 
through the typical agency rulemaking procedure with a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (“NOPR”),55 public comment period56 and a 
Final Rulemaking (“Final Rule”) addressing the changes and 
comments.57 Second, FERC issued various Policy Statements to 
help regulated entities understand different aspects of FERC’s 
investigative and enforcement process.58  
                                                             
52. See id. § 823b(d)(3)(B) (“If the civil penalty has not been paid 
within 60 calendar days after the assessment order has been made . . . the 
Commission shall institute an action in the appropriate district court of the 
United States for an order affirming the assessment of the civil penalty.”).  
53. See Order Assessing Civil Penalties, supra note 99, at 9 (“On 
November 29, 2012, Respondents each gave notice of their election under section 
31(d)(3)(A) of the FPA and the Order to Show Cause, thereby electing an 
immediate penalty assessment if the Commission finds a violation.”).  
54. See NOPR, supra note 21, at 6 (stating that the anti-
manipulation rule was meant to fulfill Congress’ intent that FERC promulgate 
rules prohibiting market manipulation). 
55. See id. (proposing regulations implementing EPAct 2005). 
56. See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 
4244, 4246 (January 26, 2006) [hereinafter “Final Rule”] (to be codified at 18 
C.F.R. pt. 1c.2) (“Thirty parties filed comments and nine parties filed reply 
comments.”).  
57. See id. (“[T]his final rule serves as the implementing provision 
designed to prohibit manipulation and fraud in the markets the Commission is 
charged with regulating.”).  
58. See, e.g., Policy Statement on Enforcement, Docket No. PL06-
01, 113 FERC ¶ 61,068, 61,243 (October 20, 2005) [hereinafter “October Policy 
Statement”]; Revised Policy Statement on Enforcement, Docket No. PL08-3, 123 
FERC ¶ 61,156, 62,008 (May 15, 2008) [hereinafter “May Policy Statement”]; 
Compliance with Statutes, Regulations, and Orders, Docket No. PL09-1, 125 
FERC ¶ 61,058, 1 (Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter “Compliance Policy Statement”]; 
Enforcement of Statutes, Order, Rules, and Regulations, Policy Statement on 
Penalty Guidelines, Docket No. PL10-4, 130 FERC ¶ 61,220, 1 (March 18, 2010) 





 First, this section discusses the FERC’s rulemaking 
procedure through the NOPR, public comment period, and the 
Final Rule.59 Second, this section discusses the Policy Statements 
that FERC has issued identifying its internal procedure for 
finding violations.60 Third, this section discusses the FERC’s 
Policy Statements identifying its positions on compliance and 
penalty guidelines.61 
 
A. Rulemaking Proceeding 
 
 On October 20, 2005, FERC issued its NOPR. Because 
Section 1283 of the EPAct was not self-actuating, FERC had to 
promulgate rules implementing the intent of Congress.62 The 
NOPR set out the proposed elements of a violation of the market 
manipulation rule and defined the phrase “any entity” in the 
statute to mean “regulated utilities but also governmental 
utilities and other market participants.”63 The rulemaking 
invited comment on the proposed elements.64 
 The NOPR indicated that anti-manipulation issues should 
be considered in light of SEC Rule 10b-5 because much of the 
language of Section 1283 of the EPAct closely mirrors the 
language of Rule 10b-5.65 By adopting established Rule 10b-5 
precedent from the SEC, FERC and Congress hoped regulated 
entities would gain guidance about how to comply with the 
manipulation rule.66 The SEC has a large body of precedent 
                                                                                                                                             
Guidelines, 132 FERC 61,216, ¶ 1 (Sep. 17, 2010) [hereinafter “September Policy 
Statement”]. 
59.  See infra Part III.A (discussing FERC’s rule promulgation). 
60. See infra Part III.B (explaining how an investigation is started, 
how the Office of Enforcement makes decisions, and how the Commission adopts 
decisions).  
61. See infra Part III.C (analyzing FERC’s policy statements 
issued on penalty guidelines and compliance).  
62.  See NOPR, supra note 21, at 2 (stating that neither of the 
statutes Congress passed were self-actuating and the rule was promulgated to 
fulfill Congress’ intent). 
63. Id. at 2.  
64. See id. at 1 (“The Commission seeks public comment on its 
proposals for the regulations . . . .”).  
65.  See id. at 3 (“The Commission proposes to pattern proposed 
sections 47.1 and 159.1 of its regulations on the text of Rule 10b-5.”). 
66. See id. at 3 (stating reliance on 10b-5 “should benefit the 
industry because it will provide greater certainty to entities subject to the new 
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regarding the rule, and it is a highly litigated administrative 
provision.67 FERC stated in the NOPR that its anti-manipulation 
rule would be interpreted with the precedent of Rule 10b-5.68  
 On January 19, 2006, FERC issued its Final Rule.69 
Because EPAct does not prohibit any actual conduct, the Final 
Rule prohibited conduct in violation of the market manipulation 
and fraud rules within the markets that FERC regulates.70 The 
rulemaking states explicitly that it is not meant to reach 
negligent practice or corporate mismanagement.71 It also 
reiterated that the rule was based on SEC Rule 10b-5.72 
 In response to the NOPR, thirty parties filed comments 
and nine parties filed reply comments.73 Overall, FERC believed 
the comments were positive toward the anti-manipulation rule.74 
The six areas that the commenters emphasized were (1) scope, (2) 
usefulness of SEC precedent, (3) disclosure implications, (4) 
elements of a violation, (5) the Final Rule’s interaction with the 
                                                                                                                                             
rules because the Commission intends to rely on the large body of case law 
interpreting and applying section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when applying its new 
authority.”).  
67. See id. (describing the large amount of precedent interpreting 
rule 10b-5).  
68. See id. (“[T]he Commission intends to rely on the large body of 
case law interpreting and applying section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when applying 
its new authority.”).  
69. See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 
4244-03, 4246 (January 26, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 1c.2) (“[T]his 
final rule serves as the implementing provision designed to prohibit 
manipulation and fraud in the markets the Commission is charged with 
regulating.”).  
70. See id. (“[T]he language of EPAct 2005 sections 315 and 1283 
does not, by itself, make any particular act unlawful.”). 
71. See id. (“The final rule is not intended to regulate negligent 
practices or corporate mismanagement, but rather to deter or punish fraud in 
wholesale energy markets.”).  
72. See id. (“These anti-manipulation sections of EPAct 2005 
closely track the prohibited conduct language in section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .”).  
73. See id. (“The 30 initial comments and nine reply comments on 
the NOPR are from a diverse group of industry stakeholders.”).  
74. See id. (“Overwhelmingly, commenters are supportive of our 
efforts to implement well-developed, clear and fair rules aimed at eliminating 




market behavior rules, and (6) procedural issues including the 
statute of limitations.75 
 Commenters’ concern about the scope of the Final Rule 
mainly grew from concerns over whether the language of the rule 
should be interpreted broadly or narrowly.76 Each clause of the 
rule was raised.77 In response, FERC stated that a reasonable 
interpretation of the terms required reading each of the terms of 
the rule as they relate to each other.78 FERC stated that the term 
“any entity” should be broadly construed.79 FERC asserted that it 
applies to parties outside FERC’s jurisdictional reach.80 The 
language that limits FERC to its expertise is the “in connection 
with a transaction” language.81 While any entity could violate the 
manipulation rule, the rule would not apply to an entity that 
violated the rule in a transaction outside FERC’s jurisdiction.82  
 Commenters expressed more concern about the 
application of SEC precedent to the market manipulation rule.83 
The main concern was that the SEC rules are meant to protect 
different parties than those protected by the FERC rule.84 The 
                                                             
75. See id. at 4246–47 (listing the six areas).  
76.  See id. at 4247 (describing arguments by commenters about 
the breadth of various aspects of the rule).  
77. See id. at 4248–49 (discussing comments that touch on each 
element of the proposed rule). 
78. See id. at 4248 (“The answer to the scope of application of the 
final rule lies in a reasonable reading of these terms in relation to each other.”). 
79.  See id. (“‘Any entity’ is a deliberately inclusive term.”).  
80.  See Kelliher, supra note 20, at 16 (2005) (noting that FERC 
would like the rule to apply outside of its normal jurisdiction).  
81. See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 
4244-03, 4249 (January 26, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 1c.2) (“[T]he 
Commission views the “in connection with” element in the energy context as 
encompassing situations in which there is a nexus between the fraudulent 
conduct of an entity and a jurisdictional transaction.”). 
82. See id. (“We do not intend to construe the Final Rule sobroadly 
as to convert every common-law fraud that happens to touch a jurisdictional 
transaction into a violation of the final rule.”)  
83. See id. (“Commentators are divided as to whether we should 
model the proposed anti-manipulation regulations after SEC rule 10b-5.”). 
84.  See id. (“Many of the commentators also argue that the 
participants in energy markets are highly sophisticated . . . unlike less 
sophisticated participants in the securities markets. . . .”). 
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SEC rules protect unknowing investors in securities.85 
Conversely, FERC’s anti-manipulation rule regulates a market 
with more experienced investors.86 However, other commenters 
argued that the sophistication of the traders in the market should 
not matter because EPAct’s purpose was to protect the consumers 
of electricity and not traders.87 The Commission took account of 
both sides of the argument and determined that in light of the 
explicit guidance of Congress, it would use SEC precedent in 
analogous cases.88 
 Next, the Commission rejected the proposed changes 
regarding both the duty to disclose and additions to intent.89 The 
Commission addressed concerns from regulated entities that 
additional duties to disclose and penalties for omissions of 
material fact would place a larger burden on regulated entities.90 
The Commission stated that the new rule does create an 
additional duty to disclose and that omissions of material fact 
between bilateral contracting parties will not necessarily be 
pursued as violations.91 Some of the commenters requested a 
more explicit enunciation of the intent requirement.92 However, 
the Commission relied on SEC Rule 10b-5’s unchanged scienter 
                                                             
85.  See id. (“[T]he securities model is one of disclosure, designed in 
large part to protect novice investors by eliminating disparities in access to 
information . . . .”).  
86. See id. (“[T]he commenters also argue that the participants in 
energy markets are largely sophisticated, and unlike less-sophisticated 
participants in the securities markets, do not need the protections of a 
disclosure regime.”).  
87. See id. at 4250 (“[T]he level of sophistication of the parties to a 
bilateral negotiation is irrelevant because the Commission’s anti-manipulation 
rules are not to protect the contracting parties from each other, but to protect 
the consumers who rely on the market for their energy supplies.”).  
88. See id. (“We intend to adapt analogous securities precedents as 
appropriate to specific facts, circumstances, and situations that arise in the 
energy industry.”).  
89.  See id. at 4251 (“The Commission declines to modify the 
proposed regulations in this final rule.”). 
90.  See id. at 4250 (identifying a possible new duty of disclosure 
and penalties for omissions as concerns from regulated entities). 
91. See id. at 4251–52 (stating there is no additional duty to 
disclose and rejecting proposals to delete or modify the rule regarding omissions 
of material fact). 
92.  See id. at 4252 (stating commenters requested FERC 




requirement to justify not including a more explicit intent 
element in a violation.93 
 The Commission accepted commenters’ request to clarify 
the required elements for a violation of the manipulation rule.94 
As a general clarification, the Commission again stated that the 
elements are largely based on the requirements needed to violate 
Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.95 FERC briefly outlined the 
meaning of the elements.96 For the scienter element, because the 
Courts of Appeal have allowed recklessness to satisfy Rule 10b-
5’s scienter requirement, recklessness also satisfies the scienter 
requirement for the manipulation rule.97 
 The Commission declined to clarify whether it would 
abolish or continue to use the market behavioral rules.98 
However, it stated that it would not seek to enforce both the 
market behavior and manipulation rules for the same violation.99 
The Commission also rejected commenters’ call for an explicit 
statute of limitations for the manipulation rule.100 The 
Commission noted that none of the SEC enforcement actions, the 
Federal Power Act or the National Gas Act, are subject to any 
statute of limitations other than the general five-year statute of 
limitations for actions enforcing civil penalties.101 The 
                                                             
93. See id. (“SEC Rule 10b-5 has an analogous section that has 
remained unchanged since it was adopted in 1942, and there is abundant 
securities law precedent that highlights the ongoing relevance of that section.”). 
94. See id. at 4253 (“The Commission generally agrees that 
clarification of the elements of a violation under the final rule would reduce 
regulatory uncertainty and thereby assure greater compliance.”).  
95.  See id. (stating that the elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim serve a 
useful purpose when analyzing a anti-manipulation claim). 
96. See id. at 4253–54 (discussing each element briefly or 
incorporating previous discussion of an element).  
97. See id. at 4254 (“[T]he Commission concludes that recklessness 
satisfies the scienter element of the final rule.”). 
98.  See id. (stating that the market behavior rules were still in 
effect and notification of repeal would be sent if they were repealed). 
99. See id. (“[T]he Commission will not seek duplicative sanctions 
for the same conduct in the event that conduct violates both the Market 
Behavior Rules and this final rule.”). 
100.  See id. at 4255 (“The Commission declines to designate a 
statute of limitations or otherwise adopt an arbitrary time limitation on 
complaints or enforcement actions that may arise under NGA section 4A and 
FPA section 222.”). 
101. See id. at 4254–55 (declining to adopt any statute of limitation 
other than the general five year statute of limitation). 
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Commission also refused to give specific examples of market 
manipulation or assert that certain actions were permissible.102 
The Commission stated that the procedures to be used are 
already established in the Commission’s precedent and rejected 
claims that it needed to explicitly describe procedures in the text 
of the rule.103 
 The only major change to the text of the rule from the 
NOPR to the Final Rule was the change from “person” to 
“entity.”104 Commenters expressed concern that under the 
definition of “person” in the Federal Power Act,105 fraud and 
manipulation conducted by organizations like municipalities 
would be actionable while actions taken against the same 
organizations would not be violations.106 The Commission agreed 
with the commenters that this oversight would be unfair and 
changed the wording of the Final Rule to include entities.107 
 The Final Rule went into effect January 19, 2006.108 The 
rule states: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any entity, directly or 
indirectly, in connection with the purchase or sale 
of electric energy or the purchase or sale of 
transmission services subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Commission, (1) to use or employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) to make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
                                                             
102. See id. at 4255 (declining to give concrete examples of 
acceptable behavior or adopt commenters’ examples as acceptable behavior).  
103. See id. at 4256 (“[T]he Commission will process the filing 
under the procedures currently set forth in Rule 206 of the Rules of Practice and 
Procedure.”).  
104. See id. (“Accordingly, the Commission will substitute the word 
“entity” for “person” in sections 1c.1(a)(3) and 1c.2(a)(3) of the final rule.”).  
105. See 16 U.S.C. § 796(4) (2014) (defining person as “an individual 
or a corporation”). 
106. See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 
4244-03, 4256 (January 26, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 1c.2) (describing 
a commenter’s argument that under the proposed section would punish 
municipalities but not allow them to qualify as victims). 
107. See id. (“[T]he Commission will substitute the word ‘entity’ for 
‘person’ in sections 1c.1(a)(3) and 1c.2(a)(3) of the final rule.”).  




statements made, in light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or (3) 
to engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any entity.109 
 
B. FERC’S Anti-Manipulation Enforcement Procedure 
 
 FERC has created a complicated procedural structure to 
oversee potential market manipulation.110 FERC settles 75% of 
its cases before they become public through procedures outlined 
in Policy Statements.111 On October 20, 2005, along with its Final 
Rule, FERC issued its first Policy Statement.112 A Policy 
Statement is not a rule with force of law; it is a guidance 
document meant to give regulated entities an idea how FERC 
plans to enforce the rules it implements.113 FERC’s May 15, 2008 
Policy Statement also provides guidance on enforcement 
procedures.114 An investigation begins in the Office of 
Enforcement, where it attempts to settle the case, and if the 
                                                             
109. Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 
4244-03, 4258 (January 26, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 1c.2). 
110. See May Policy Statement, Docket No. PL08-3, 123 FERC ¶ 
61,156, 62,010 (May 15, 2008) (describing “the steps involved in an audit and 
the steps involved in an investigation”). 
111. See id. (“[B]etween 2005 and 2007, Enforcement staff closed 
approximately 75 percent of its investigations without any sanctions being 
imposed.”).  
112. See October Policy Statement, Docket No. PL06-01, 113 FERC 
¶ 61,068, 61,243 (October 20, 2005) (“The Commission issues this Policy 
Statement to provide guidance and regulatory certainty regarding our 
enforcement of the statutes, orders, rules, and regulations we administer.”).  
113. See id. (“Our purpose is to provide firm but fair enforcement of 
our rules and regulations and to place entities subject to our jurisdiction on 
notice of the consequences of violating the statutes, orders, rules, and 
regulations we enforce.”).  
114. See May Policy Statement, Docket No. PL08-3, 123 FERC ¶ 
61,156, 62,010 (May 15, 2008) (“[T]he non-public nature of much of Enforcement 
staff's work, coupled with the potential for the imposition of significant 
monetary penalties, argues for a fuller explication than we have yet provided as 
to how we conduct our investigations and determine the imposition of remedies, 
including civil penalties.”). 
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Office does not, it gives a recommendation to the Commission.115 
The Commission then decides whether to issue an order to show 
cause while continuing to attempt to settle with the regulated 
entity.116 If an order to show cause is issued, the regulated entity 
must decide whether it wants to submit to a hearing in front of 
an ALJ.117 If it does not want to go through the agency 
proceeding, it can force FERC to issue an Order Assessing Civil 
Penalties and file to have the order affirmed in a federal district 
court.118 
 On October 20, 2005, FERC issued a statement that 
outlined factors FERC would use to make decisions about 
enforcement proceedings and assessment of penalties.119 The 
Commission believed that in light of the enhanced power it 
received under EPAct, it should explicitly state its policies on 
cooperation and other mitigating factors.120 The Commission 
noted that the past policies of other agencies have defied 
formulas and looked at cases individually.121 In the same way, 
                                                             
115. See id. at 62,012 (“By regulation, Enforcement staff is 
authorized to initiate and conduct investigations relating to any matter subject 
to our jurisdiction.”).  
116.  See id. at 62,014 (“Following issuance of the Order to Show 
Cause, potential settlement may proceed in accordance with the requirements of 
Rule 602 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.”). 
117. See 16 U.S.C. § 823b(d) (2014) (providing for notice to the 
regulated entity that they may elect to skip agency proceedings or have a 
hearing in front of an ALJ).  
118. See id. § 823b(d)(3)(B) (“[T]he Commission shall institute an 
action in the appropriate district court of the United States for an order 
affirming the assessment of the civil penalty.”).  
119. See October Policy Statement, Docket No. PL06-01, 113 FERC 
¶ 61,068, 61,243 (October 20, 2005) (“The Policy Statement discusses the factors 
we will take into account in determining remedies for violations, including 
applying the enhanced civil penalty authority provided by the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005.”). 
120. See id. (stating that given its new authority, FERC wanted to 
“assure the industry that we will temper strong enforcement measures with 
consideration of all relevant factors, including mitigating factors, in determining 
the appropriate remedies.”).  
121. See id. at 61,245 (noting that the SEC and CFTC penalty 
schemes “emphasized the importance of considering a range of factors that may 
lead to different penalty decisions depending on the circumstances presented by 




FERC would not commit to a specific formula and would 
emphasize flexibility.122 
 The October Policy Statement outlines a two-step process 
to determine the penalty for a violation.123 Each step lists factors 
used to analyze the regulated entity’s conduct.124 The first step 
considered is the seriousness of the offense.125 Some factors 
include who committed the violation, what type of harm resulted 
from the violation, and whether the violation was willful.126 The 
second step is what the regulated entity did to remedy the 
problem.127 Mitigating factors include internal compliance, self-
reporting a violation, and cooperative conduct.128 Cooperative 
conduct can reduce a penalty even if the entity did not self-
report.129 None of the mitigating factors in step two apply to 
reduce disgorgement of unjust profits because the harm has 
already occurred.130 
 On May 15, 2008, FERC issued a revised statement on 
enforcement. The statement is meant to give regulated entities 
an idea how FERC determines if a penalty is warranted and how 
its investigative process works.131 The Commission felt that 
                                                             
122. See id. at 61,246 (“[W]e will not prescribe specific penalties or 
develop formulas for different violations.”).  
123.  See id. at 61,245 (identifying the seriousness of the offense and 
timely efforts to remedy the violation as the most important factors).  
124.  See id. at 61,247–49 (listing factors FERC will use to interpret 
different aspects of the process to determine a penalty).  
125.  See id. at 61,246 (“[T]he seriousness of the violation is the first 
touchstone for our determination of the level of penalty to be imposed.”).  
126. See id. at 61,247 (listing factors used to determine the 
seriousness of the offense).  
127.  See id. (“The second point to be taken into account as required 
by section 316A of the FPA and new section 22 of the NGA is what efforts the 
company made to remedy the violation in a timely manner.”).  
128. See id. at 61,247–49 (listing factors used to determine the 
effect of the three aspects oftimely remedy).  
129. See id. at 61,248 (“[T]he Commission will consider these 
factors even for entities that did not self-report violations, provided that 
cooperation was provided once the violation was uncovered.”).  
130.  See id. at 61,247 (“[A]t a minimum a company involved in 
wrongdoing must disgorge any unjust profits resulting from the wrongdoing.”).  
131. See Stuart Caplan et al., What Invigorated FERC and FCPA 
Enforcement Activity Means for US Energy Companies, ASPATORE, 2014 WL 
10387, 3 (Jan. 2014) (“The Revised Enforcement Policy Statement gives 
regulated entities a better understanding of how FERC’s investigative process 
 
6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 1 (2014) 216 
because only enforcement actions that ended in penalties became 
public, the Commission needed to issue the Policy Statement.132 
The revised statement updates FERC’s polices from the 2005 
Policy Statement.133 
 FERC’s Office of Enforcement receives cases from internal 
and external sources.134 Before deciding whether to open an 
investigation, the Office reviews the details of the potential case 
and may look at additional available information.135 If the Office 
determines that that there is a basis for an investigation, it 
informs the regulated entity that it will open an investigation.136 
If no basis for an investigation exists, the regulated entity is 
notified that there will not be an investigation.137 
 If an investigation is opened, regulated entities are only 
allowed to communicate with specifically designated staff.138 
FERC does have and use the discovery process to gather facts and 
                                                                                                                                             
works and provides details on the factors FERC considers in determining 
whether a penalty is warranted.”). 
132. See May Policy Statement, Docket No. PL08-3-000, 123 FERC 
¶ 61156, 62,010 (May 15, 2008) (stating that the regulated community did not 
have a sense for the enforcement actions that did not result in penalties and 
wanted to give regulated entities a better sense of enforcement procedures).  
133. See id. at 1–2 (describing the 2005 policy statement and the 
reasons why it needed to be supplemented). 
134. See id. at 6 (listing sources of investigations including the 
Division of Audits, Division of Energy Market Oversight, other Commission 
offices, and referrals from market monitors). 
135.  See id. (stating that before an investigation begins, staff look 
at information included the referral information and potentially information 
from outside sources or the regulated entity). 
136. See id. at 7 (“If . . . staff determines that an investigation 
should be opened, it will notify the subject of that fact.”). 
137. See id. (“If . . . staff determines that an investigation is not 
warranted, it will so notify the subject of the inquiry, assuming the subject is 
aware that an investigation is under consideration.”).  
138. See id. at 9 (“[N]either the Commissioners nor their assistants 
will receive oral communications . . . from any person concerning an ongoing 
staff investigation as to which such person is the subject.”); see also Suedeen 
Kelly & Julia E. Sullivan, Navigating the FERC Enforcement Process, 
ASPATORE, 2014 WL 10384, 7 (2014) (“Staff members involved in the 
investigation are designated as ‘non-decisional,’ which means they may not have 





data during an investigation.139 At any time during the 
investigation, Office of Enforcement staff can close an 
investigation.140 Enforcement staff can settle cases with consent 
from the Commission and attempt to do so before recommending 
that the Commission issue an Order to Show Cause.141 JP 
Morgan settled with FERC at this stage.142 When settlement 
occurs at this stage, a Stipulation and Consent Agreement 
between the regulated entity and staff is released publicly.143  
 When the Office of Enforcement and the regulated entity 
cannot reach a settlement, the Office of Enforcement recommends 
the Commission issue an Order to Show Cause.144 The regulated 
entity is notified that it may attempt to demonstrate why the 
Commission should not issue an Order to Show Cause.145 If the 
Commission decides to issue the Order to Show Cause, the 
settlement discussion can take place between the regulated entity 
and the Commission.146 If the parties do not reach a settlement 
by that point, the statute governing the violation at issue takes 
                                                             
139. See May Policy Statement, Docket No. PL08-3, 123 FERC ¶ 
61,156, 62,014–15 (May 15, 2008) (describing FERC’s discovery processes and 
mechanisms during an investigation).  
140. See id. at 62,013 (“At any time during the course of its 
investigation, staff may determine to close the investigation without taking any 
further action.”).  
141. See id. (stating that when staff does not close an investigation 
“staff requests settlement authority from the Commission and, in that request, 
seeks authority to negotiate within a range of potential civil penalties and/or 
disgorgement.”).  
142. See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, 
Docket No. IN 11-8 & IN 13-5, 142 FERC ¶ 61,041, 1 [hereinafter “JP Morgan 
Consent Agreement”] (July 30, 2013) (stating that Office of Enforcement staff 
reached a settlement with JP Morgan and describing the Office of Enforcement’s 
investigation). 
143. See May Policy Statement, Docket No. PL08-3, 123 FERC ¶ 
61,156, 62,014 (May 15, 2008) (“Upon approval, the Stipulation and Consent 
Agreement and the order approving the settlement are generally released 
publicly.”). 
144. See id. (“[S]taff may recommend that the Commission initiate 
enforcement proceedings.”).  
145. See id. (“[T]he subject . . . may make a submission to the 
Commission to present its case as to why an Order to Show Cause should not 
issue.”). 
146.  See id. (“Following issuance of the Order to Show Cause, 
potential settlement may proceed in accordance with the requirements of Rule 
602 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.”).  
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over.147 The statute at issue in an anti-manipulation claim is 
section 31(d) of the Federal Power Act.148 Once Section 31(d) 
becomes the governing statute, the regulated entity has three 
options: it can pay the fine, refuse to pay the fine and go through 
agency proceedings, or refuse to pay the fine and force FERC to 
file in Federal District Court.149 
The Commission also addressed how it arrives at remedies 
in a given situation. FERC emphasized that its disgorgement of 
profits policies remained the same, and that the Commission did 
not believe that it should employ a penalty schedule to decide the 
amount of civil penalties to impose for a violation.150 The 
headings for the factors FERC takes into account are the 
seriousness of the offense, commitment to compliance, self-
reporting, cooperation, and reliance on staff guidance.151 
Seriousness of the offense and commitment to compliance remain 
the most important factors.152 The Commission retained all the 
seriousness of offense factors it listed in the 2005 Policy 
Statement, added additional factors, and gave a list of questions 
regulated entities can ask to determine if they have a good 
compliance culture.153 The factors for self-reporting and 
                                                             
147.  See id. (“In the event there is no settlement, the proceeding 
will continue according to the process prescribed by the particular statute 
governing the violation at issue, as well as in accordance with any additional 
procedures set forth by the Commission in orders issued in the particular 
proceeding.”).  
148. See Process for Assessing Civil Penalties, 117 FERC ¶ 61,317, 
1–2 (Dec. 21, 2006) (describing the statutes that govern violation of the Federal 
Power Act). 
149. See 16 U.S.C. § 823b(d) (2014) (providing that after the Order 
to Show Cause a regulated entity may pay its fine, go to a hearing with an ALJ, 
or elect to take FERC to federal court).  
150. See May Policy Statement, Docket No. PL08-3, 123 FERC ¶ 
61,156, 62,014–17 (May 15, 2008) (describing disgorgement in addition to civil 
penalties and reaffirming the approach of the 2005 statement).  
151. See id. at 62017 (“[T]he factors we consider in determining 
whether a civil penalty should be imposed . . . are grouped under the following 
headings: seriousness of the offense, commitment to compliance, self-reporting, 
cooperation, and reliance on staff guidance.”). 
152. See id. (“Of these factors, the most important in determining 
the amount of the penalty are the seriousness of the offense and the strength of 
the entity's commitment to compliance.”).  
153. See id. (adding factors including the efficient working of the 





cooperation remained the same from the 2005 Policy 
Statement.154 
 
C. Other Information FERC Has Provided to Regulated 
Entities through Policy Statements 
 
 FERC has also issued guidance on topics besides 
procedure. It issued a Policy Statement on compliance and two 
Policy Statements adopting penalty guidelines.155 First, on 
October 16, 2008, FERC issued a revised statement on 
compliance meant to help regulated entities maintain compliance 
with FERC’s rules.156 In the Policy Statement, the FERC outlined 
four main factors that it uses.157 The factors are “(1) the role of 
senior management in fostering compliance; (2) effective 
preventive measures to ensure compliance; (3) prompt detection, 
cessation, and reporting of violations; and (4) remediation 
efforts.”158 Each factor is discussed in detail.159 The policy 
statement also includes additional information on how 
compliance affects penalties.160 
 Second, on March 18, 2010, FERC issued an order 
adopting penalty guidelines.161 The guidelines are modeled after 
the federal sentencing guidelines for organizations and are meant 
                                                                                                                                             
penalty that discourages improper conduct without discouraging market 
participation, and the motivation of the improperly acting entity). 
154. See id. (“We carry forward from the 2005 Policy Statement the 
factors we examine in determining the credit to be given for self-reporting.”). 
155. See generally Compliance Policy Statement, Docket No. PL09-
1, 125 FERC ¶ 61,058, 1 (Oct. 16, 2008); see also March Penalty Guidelines, 
Docket No. PL10-4, 130 FERC ¶ 61,220, 1 (March 18, 2010); September Policy 
Statement, 132 FERC ¶ 61,216, 62,117 (Sep. 17, 2010). 
156. See Caplan, supra note 133, at 3 (“On October 16, 2008, FERC 
issued a Policy Statement on Compliance to provide guidance to regulated 
entities with respect to FERC's governing statutes, regulations and orders.”).  
157. See Compliance Policy Statement, Docket No. PL09-1, 125 
FERC ¶ 61,058, 1 (Oct. 16, 2008) (listing the four factors).  
158. Id. 
159. See id. at 4–6 (discussing and giving guidance on each factor). 
160. See id. at 6–7 (explaining the effect of the factors on penalties 
but emphasizing that all determinations are on a case by case basis).  
161. See March Penalty Guidelines, Docket No. PL10-4, 130 FERC 
¶ 61,220, 1 (March 18, 2010) (“The Commission issues this Policy Statement on 
Penalty Guidelines for the purpose of adding greater fairness, consistency, and 
transparency to our civil penalty determinations.”). 
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to provide more transparency and fairness when imposing 
penalties.162 Although FERC originally denied requests to create 
penalty guidelines, eventually FERC decided to adopt 
guidelines.163 FERC emphasized that the sentencing guidelines 
are patterned after the same seriousness of violation and efforts 
to remedy as is required of FERC in the EPAct.164 FERC believes 
that the objective requirement of the penalty guidelines will help 
create uniformity as the Commission manages a growing number 
of enforcement actions.165  
 Under the penalty guidelines for organizations, there is a 
two-step process to determine a fine. First, FERC comes up with 
a base fine depending on the organization’s gain, loss created, or 
a statutory mandate.166 Second, FERC comes up with a multiplier 
based on the organization’s culpability.167 The culpability of the 
organization is based on a list of factors.168 After the base fine and 
multiplier are calculated, the two numbers are added together to 
get the amount of the fine.169 Although one stated disadvantage is 
that FERC has less discretion to assess fines on a case-by-case 
basis, FERC asserted that it has the ability to deviate from the 
                                                             
162. See id. (“The Commission’s Penalty Guidelines . . . are modeled 
on portions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines . . . with appropriate 
modifications to account for Commission-specific considerations.”).  
163. See id. at 2 (“We now believe that it is in the public interest to 
advance our past use of the Sentencing Guidelines' principles by implementing a 
guidelines approach patterned after the Sentencing Guidelines, which apply 
factors in a focused manner to promote fairness and consistency . . . .”).  
164. See id. (“Congress instructs that we must specifically consider 
the seriousness of the violation and the efforts a company takes to remedy it.”).  
165. See id. at 9 (“The uniformity of the guidelines approach 
reduces the potential disparities in penalties that might otherwise arise for 
similar violations committed by similarly situated offenders, particularly 
because a uniform approach ensures that similar cases are considered based on 
more than just institutional judgment.”).  
166. See id. at 6 (“First, the Sentencing Guidelines require the 
calculation of a base fine.”).  
167.  See id. (“Second, the Sentencing Guidelines produce a 
multiplier range for the base fine . . . .”). 
168.  See id. (listing factors like history of compliance, level of 
management involved in the offense, self-reporting, and whether the entity had 
an effective compliance program). 
169. See id. (“The multiplier and the base fine are then combined to 




penalty guidelines.170 The penalty guidelines produce a range for 
a fine rather than an exact figure.171 In the end, FERC decided 
that the benefits of adopting the guidelines outweighed the 
disadvantages.172 The Commission pointed out that the penalty 
guidelines do not apply to the amount of disgorged profits a 
company must pay, and the penalty guidelines do not apply to 
natural persons who violate rules or regulations.173 
 Third, on September 17, 2010, FERC issued a statement 
regarding penalty guidelines.174 The Policy Statement was meant 
to respond to comments made by the industry, explain the kind of 
weight FERC gives to the factors in the penalty guidelines, and 
amend the penalty guidelines in certain places.175 In response to 
the Commission suspending the penalty guidelines for sixty days 
to receive comments, the Commission received forty-one 
comments.176 Many comments related to topics other than anti-
manipulation enforcement.177 However, FERC stated it departs 
from the penalty guidelines on a case-by-case basis, Office of 
Enforcement Staff still has the ability to close enforcement 
proceedings,178 and compliance is still important for determining 
                                                             
170. See id. at 10 (“The Penalty Guidelines, however, reduce the 
impact of this concern by allowing us to depart from the guidelines where we 
deem appropriate.”). 
171. See id. (“[T]he Penalty Guidelines produce a penalty range, 
rather than an absolute figure.”).  
172. See id. at 11 (“[W]e believe that the benefits outweigh the 
disadvantages and that a guidelines approach to determining penalties is best 
for the Commission, organizations, and the public at large.”).  
173. See id. at 18 (describing why the penalty guidelines do not 
affect disgorgement of profits and that the Commission does not have much 
experience levying fines on individuals).  
174. See Caplan, supra note 131, at 3 (“On September 17, 2010, 
FERC issued a Revised Policy Statement on Penalty Guidelines and revised 
Penalty Guidelines.”). 
175. See September Policy Statement, 132 FERC ¶ 61,216, 62,117 
(Sep. 17, 2010) (stating the reasons that the FERC issued the policy statement).  
176. See id. at 62,118 (“[T]he Commission suspended the Policy 
Statement on Penalty Guidelines and application of the Penalty Guidelines to 
allow sixty days within which comments could be submitted.”).  
177. See id. (stating that the comments covered a broad range of 
subjects).  
178. See id. at 62,121 (“Staff will continue to close all investigations 
where no violation is found, and to close some investigations without sanctions 
for certain violations that are relatively minor in nature and that result in little 
or no potential or actual harm.”). 
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a fine.179 Additionally, the points system for compliance type 
conduct is broken into different categories.180 FERC advised that 
settlements with FERC count as adjudications in an 
organization’s past history.181 The amount of any loss determined 
by FERC must be determined under a substantial evidence 
burden.182  
 
IV. Recent FERC Enforcement Proceedings 
 
 FERC enforces through its Office of Enforcement. 
Recently, FERC has engaged in more enforcement proceedings 
than ever before.183 Although FERC’s stated overall goal is 
compliance, recent investigations of high profile financial 
institutions indicate that FERC is not afraid to give out large 
fines.184 FERC stated in its fiscal report for 2013 that market 
manipulation will continue to be one of its priorities in 2014.185 
FERC noted that in the past year it has approved the largest 
settlement in FERC history and issued the largest order 
assessing penalties in its history.186 FERC brought in an 
                                                             
179. See id. at 62,132 (“[U]nder the Penalty Guidelines, an effective 
compliance program could result in a ninety-five percent reduction in penalties 
when combined with other factors.”).  
180. See id. at 62,137 (“The Commission agrees to modify the 
Penalty Guidelines so that the mitigation credits for self-reports, cooperation, 
avoidance of trial-type hearings, and acceptance of responsibility are not tied 
together.”). 
181.  See id. at 62,140 (“The Commission rejects the commenters’ 
suggestion that we not treat prior settlements as ‘adjudications’ that would 
trigger the prior history enhancement under the Penalty Guidelines.”). 
182. See id. at 62,147 (“[T]he Commission is, in fact, required under 
the APA to base imposition of any sanction on ‘substantial evidence.’”). 
183. See Caplan, supra note 131, at 1 (“Gas and electric utility 
companies are finding themselves the target of heightened scrutiny by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission . . . Office of Enforcement . . . in 
connection with their activities in the US energy markets.”). 
184. See id. at 1 (“The past few years suggest, however, that 
investigating high profile companies and securing increasingly large 
disgorgement and civil penalty remedies has become the OE's main focus.”).  
185.  See 2013 Report on Enforcement, Docket No. AD07-13-006, 2–3 
(describing policies and overviewing the amount of penalties collected in the 
past year).  
186. See id. at 4 (stating that the “Commission approved its largest 




unprecedented $445 million in civil penalties and disgorgement of 
profits in the past year and shows no signs of slowing down.187 
 On January 22, 2013, Deutsche Bank agreed to pay $1.5 
million in fines and over $172,000 in disgorgement of profits.188 
Deutsche Bank violated the anti-manipulation rule in the 
California Independent System Operator Corporation (“CAISO”) 
by trading at a loss in one product to benefit another product.189 
Because the transactions were undertaken at a loss and without 
regard for regular market principles, the transactions committed 
fraud against the market by artificially moving the Congestion 
Revenue Rights Index (“CRR”) in a direction that took away the 
risk in Deutsche Bank’s trading.190  
 On February 1, 2013, FERC entered a stipulation with 
Oceanside Power, LLC after it agreed to pay $51,000 in civil 
penalties and disgorgement of profits.191 Oceanside violated the 
anti-manipulation rule by misusing trades to get a larger share of 
a payout based on the share of the amount of power bought in 
that hour.192 An Oceanside trader, Robert Scavo, knowingly 
bought an extraordinarily large share of the power even though 
                                                             
187. See id. at 8 (overviewing the amount of penalties collected 
through settlements in the past year).  
188. See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, 
Docket No. IN 12-4, 142 FERC ¶ 61,056, 1 (Jan. 22, 2013) (“The Commission 
approves the attached Stipulation and Consent Agreement (Agreement) 
between the Office of Enforcement (Enforcement) and DB Energy Trading LLC 
(Deutsche Bank).”).  
189. See id. at 8 (“Enforcement determined that . . . Deutsche Bank 
violated the Commission's Anti-Manipulation Rule by engaging in transactions 
in one product . . . with the intent to benefit a second product . . . .”).  
190. See id. at 8 (“Enforcement determined that by hindering the 
proper functioning of the CRR and physical markets, which are both 
jurisdictional markets, Deutsche Bank's Export Strategy was a scheme that 
operated as a ‘fraud or deceit’ under the Commission's Anti-Manipulation 
Rule.”).  
191. See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, 
Docket No. IN 10-5,142 FERC ¶ 61,088, 1 (Feb. 1, 2013) (“The Commission 
approves the attached Stipulation and Consent Agreement . . . signed by the 
Office of Enforcement . . . Oceanside Power, LLC . . . and Robert Scavo.”).  
192. See id. at 2 (“Enforcement determined that Oceanside used the 
UTC transaction at the South Imp/South Exp pricing nodes as a pretext to 
reserve a large volume of transmission and thereby earn larger share of the 
MLSA for the hours in which it submitted a schedule.” ).  
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the trades themselves would lose money.193 However, Scavo 
bought the power in a type of transaction in a market where he 
could lose money on the transactions but make a profit through 
the payout from his large market share.194 
 On March 22, 2013, Rumford Paper agreed to pay $10 
million in civil penalties and $2 million in disgorgement of unjust 
profits.195 Rumford violated the anti-manipulation rule by taking 
advantage of a load reduction program in the ISO-New 
England.196 In a plan coordinated by the CEO of another 
company, Rumford established a baseline rate of use of its facility 
much higher than its normal rate.197 A load-reducing program 
operated on the company’s promise to reduce the load when they 
bid at a low rate of operation.198 However, Rumford caused its 
facility to set a baseline load capacity at its highest possible 
rate.199 Because the baseline rate was the highest rate at which 
the plant could run, the promise to reduce load capacity was not a 
promise to reduce capacity at all.200 Instead, it was a promise to 
use the facility as Rumford always did and get paid for reducing 
their capacity.201 
                                                             
193. See id. (“Enforcement determined that from July 29, 2010 
through August 4, 2010, Robert Scavo submitted UTC transaction bids at the 
“South Imp” and “South Exp” node pair on behalf of Oceanside.”).  
194. See id. at 2–3 (describing Oceanside’s scheme to lose at a fixed 
rate and gain on the payout). 
195.  See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, 
Docket No. IN 12-11, 142 FERC ¶ 61,218, 1 (Mar. 22, 2013) (“Rumford admits to 
the facts set forth in the Agreement, but neither admits nor denies the 
allegations and has agreed to a civil penalty of $10,000,000 and disgorgement of 
$2,836,419.08.”). 
196. See id. at 1–3 (describing Rumford’s participation in ISO-NE). 
197. See id. at 9 (“[O]nce the baseline was established, Rumford 
would operate G4 as it typically had operated.”). 
198. See id. at 8 (“DALRP participants offered load reductions for 
the next day from the hours of 7:00 AM through 6:00 PM on non-holiday 
weekdays and, if ISO-NE accepted the offer, the participant was obligated to 
reduce load the next day.”). 
199. See id. at 11 (“Enforcement found that Rumford's scheme was 
based on misrepresentations to ISO-NE about Rumford's typical load . . . .”). 
200. See id. (“Rumford and CES were compensated for load 
response that they knew would never occur and in fact never occurred.”). 
201. See id. (“Rumford did not intend to reduce its consumption or 




 On July 30, 2013, FERC and JP Morgan entered a 
stipulation agreement.202 The JP Morgan enforcement action is 
closest in amount to the current Barclays enforcement.203 FERC 
assessed $285 million in civil penalties and $125 million for 
disgorgement of profits.204 FERC alleged and JP Morgan 
stipulated that in western energy markets, JP Morgan traders 
intentionally manipulated the computer systems of CAISO to 
receive above market prices for its power generators that 
otherwise lost money.205 JP Morgan traders’ conduct included 
concealing their scheme when asked directly by CAISO market 
monitors and not submitting documents that were truthful to the 
profitability of their plants.206 The JP Morgan traders knew the 
plants were not as valuable as the payouts from CAISO and 
received daily reports on the payments from CAISO.207 
 
V. FERC’S Enforcement Proceeding Against Barclays  
 
 In July of 2007, FERC’s Office of Enforcement notified 
Barclays that it was investigating Barclays’ trading practices in 
                                                             
 202. See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Decree, Docket 
No. IN 11-8 & IN13-5, 144 FERC ¶ 61,068, 1 [herein after JP Morgan Consent 
Agreement] (July 30, 2013) (“The Commission approves the attached Stipulation 
and Consent Agreement . . . between the Office of Enforcement . . . and JP 
Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation . . . .”). 
203. See id. (stating FERC assessed $285 million in civil penalties 
and $125 million in unjust profits). 
204. See id. (“JPMVEC admits the facts set forth in Section II of the 
Agreement, neither admits nor denies the violations set forth in Section III, 
agrees to pay a civil penalty of $285,000,000, agrees to disgorge alleged unjust 
profits of $125,000,000 . . . .”).  
205. See id. at 12 (“[T]o make profits from power plants that were 
usually out of the money, JPMVEC submitted Day Ahead bids that falsely 
appeared economic to CAISO and MISO’s automated market software and that 
were intended to, and did, lead CAISO and MISO to pay it at rates far above 
market prices.”). 
206. See id. at 20 (“When asked by the CAISO MMU why it 
submitted negative Day Ahead bids rather than energy self-schedules, JPMVEC 
stated that self-scheduling would result in unknowable compensation and could 
cause JPMVEC to receive payment at a level that is too low.”). 
207. See id. at 26 (“JPMVEC knew that the ISOs received no 
benefit from making inflated payments to JPMVEC, and thus defrauded the 
ISOs by obtaining payments for benefits . . . that JPMVEC did not deliver.”). 
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Western energy markets.208 The Office of Enforcement staff 
began privately investigating Barclays in October of 2008.209 On 
October 31, 2012, the Commission issued an Order to Show 
Cause, which began a public proceeding against Barclays.210 
FERC asserts that Barclays unlawfully manipulated 
markets from November 2006 to December 2008 through 
Western power traders Daniel Brin, Scott Connelly, Karen 
Levine, and Ryan Smith.211 FERC alleges that the traders 
manipulated FERC regulated physical markets for 655 days.212 
FERC specifically alleges Barclays “traded fixed price products 
not in an attempt to profit from the relationship between the 
market fundamentals of supply and demand, but instead for the 
fraudulent purpose of moving the Index price at a particular 
point so that Barclays' financial swap positions at that same 
trading point would benefit.”213 Essentially, Barclays traded at a 
loss to push the Index to a good position for financial swaps 
Barclays owned.214 When Barclays was due to pay on the 
financial swaps, the traders would artificially deflate the index, 
                                                             
208. See Order Assessing Civil Penalties, Docket No. IN08-8, 144 
FERC ¶ 61,041, 4 (July 16, 2013) (“On July 3, 2007, OE Staff notified Barclays 
that it had begun an investigation of allegations that Barclays and some of its 
traders manipulated the electricity markets in and around California beginning 
in November 2006.”). 
209. See id. (“The Commission issued a non-public order of formal 
investigation on October 2, 2008.”). 
210. See id. (“The Commission issued the Order to Show Cause to 
commence this public proceeding on October 31, 2012.”). 
211. See id. at 1 (“On October 31, 2012, the Commission issued an 
order directing Barclays Bank . . . Daniel Brin, Scott Connelly, Karen Levine, 
and Ryan Smith . . . to show cause why they should not be found to have 
violated section 1c.2 of the Commission's regulations by manipulating the 
electricity markets in and around California from November 2006 to December 
2008.”).  
212.  See id. at 2 (“Respondents intentionally engaged in an 
unlawful scheme to manipulate prices on 655 product days over 35 product 
months in the period between November 2006 to December 2008 in the 
Commission-regulated physical markets at the four most liquid trading points 
in the western United States.”).  
213. Id. 
214. See id. (describing Barclays’ alleged scheme to manipulate 




and when Barclays was due to be paid, they would artificially 
inflate the index.215 
 On November 29, 2012, both Barclays and its traders 
elected Federal Power Act Section 31(d)(3) that allows FERC to 
assess civil penalties, circumventing the entire agency process.216 
Through that procedure, FERC assesses penalties and gives the 
parties sixty days to pay the fines.217 If Barclays and the traders 
did not pay the fines within sixty days, FERC could file suit in 
federal court to ask for an order forcing the parties to pay the 
fines.218 
 On July 16, 2013, FERC issued an Order Assessing Civil 
Penalties based on an Office of Enforcement report 
recommending penalties.219 In the order, FERC provided 
arguments for why Barclays violated the anti-manipulation rule 
and addressed some counterarguments Barclays asserted during 
the administrative process.220 The order addresses FERC’s 
evidence according to three elements required by FERC’s anti-
manipulation rule.221 FERC adopted a burden shifting analysis to 
determine that the Office of Enforcement report established a 
prima facie case.222 To determine the penalty, FERC would follow 
the policies as set out in its Policy Statements.223 
                                                             
215. See id. (“OE Staff has shown that the intended effect of trading 
Dailies to flatten the Physical Positions was to influence the daily ICE Index 
settlement price at that trading point.”). 
216. See id. at 5 (“On November 29, 2012, Respondents each gave 
notice of their election under section 31(d)(3)(A) of the FPA and the Order to 
Show Cause, thereby electing an immediate penalty assessment if the 
Commission finds a violation.”). 
217. See 16 U.S.C. § 823b(d)(3)(B) (2014) (giving a regulated entity 
60 days to pay a fine).  
218. See id. (“[T]he Commission shall institute an action in the 
appropriate district court of the United States for an order affirming the 
assessment of the civil penalty.”).  
219. See Order Assessing Civil Penalties, Docket No. IN08-8, 144 
FERC ¶ 61,041, 75–76 (July 16, 2013) (“The Commission finds that Respondents 
violated the Commission's Anti-Manipulation Rule from November 2006 to 
December 2008 by manipulating the energy markets in and around California 
through the use of a coordinated, fraudulent scheme.”). 
220.  See id. at 6–48 (discussing arguments on preliminary issues, 
the merits, and the appropriateness of the assessed fine). 
221.  See id. at 9–36 (describing the evidence against Barclays 
regarding all three elements of the anti-manipulation rule). 
222. See id. at 6 (finding “a prima facie case that Respondents 
effectuated a manipulative scheme” which means the “burden, therefore, falls 
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 After dismissing Barclays’ and its traders’ initial 
arguments asserting fairness of process, statute of limitations, 
and waiver claims, FERC proceeded to its evidence on the merits 
of the case.224 The first element addressed was whether there was 
a fraudulent device, scheme, or artifice.225 The Commission 
determines fraud factually and defines it as including “any 
action, transaction, or conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, 
obstructing or defeating a well-functioning market.”226 FERC 
argues that this element is met by a pattern of coordinated 
actions by which the traders completed transactions in FERC’s 
jurisdictional markets in California to push ICE index prices into 
favorable positions for financial swaps.227 FERC relies on the fact 
that the losses taken by the traders were avoidable.228 Barclays 
and its traders assert multiple defenses based generally on their 
belief that FERC’s allegations are cherry-picked and do not 
constitute a scheme to commit fraud.229 
 On the fraud element, Barclays’ first counterargument is 
that there is no joint scheme.230 FERC asserts an email from 
Karen Levine, an email from Scott Connelly, and trading data as 
                                                                                                                                             
upon Respondents to rebut the prima facie case established in the Staff 
Report”). 
223. See id. at 5 (stating that the seriousness of the offense and 
efforts to remedy the violation are factors to consider). 
224. See id. at 6–8 (discussing burden of proof, fairness of process, 
the statute of limitations, and estoppel). 
225. See id. at 9 (“The first element we address in determining 
whether there was a violation of the Anti-Manipulation Rule is establishing 
whether there was a fraudulent device, scheme, or artifice, or whether there was 
a course of business that operated as a fraud.”). 
226. Id. at 11. 
227.  See id. at 9 (“OE Staff avers that Respondents engaged in a 
coordinated scheme to assemble “substantial” Physical Positions which were 
generally in the opposite direction of Respondents' fixed-for-floating Financial 
Swaps.”). 
228. See id. at 10 (“OE Staff avers that the execution of Dailies by 
Respondents generally produced trading losses which were avoidable.”). 
229. See id. (“Respondents counter that the conduct ‘cherry-
picked’ by OE Staff does not equate to a fraudulent device, scheme or artifice in 
violation of the Anti-Manipulation Rule nor was it a course of business that 
operated or would operate as a fraud in violation of that Rule.”) 
230. See id. (“ Respondents, in defense, argue . . . there is no 




evidence of the joint scheme.231 As an example, FERC relies on 
Levine’s email to the other traders asking them to ensure that 
while she is on vacation, the Index stays high on a position that 
Barclays will be paid and low on a position that Barclays must 
pay out.232 In response to the email, FERC asserts that Smith 
and Brin moved the index and that their response to the email 
proves the existence of a joint scheme.233 
 Barclays also attempts to argue that no pattern exists to 
prove a scheme because FERC is cherry picking only certain 
trading.234 Barclays attempts to direct FERC to its overall trading 
during the alleged months, but FERC asserts that the only 
relevant activity is the alleged manipulative activity.235 FERC 
believes that Barclays’ trading not in question is irrelevant.236 
The key for FERC is that, in the markets at issue, Barclays 
acquired financial positions, which they significantly moved in a 
direction beneficial to Barclays.237 FERC asserts that these moves 
overwhelm Barclays’ counterargument of any larger picture 
trading or daily trading.238 FERC dismisses Barclays’ argument 
about profitability because the profitability of daily or monthly 
trading is not determinative on the issue of manipulation.239 
                                                             
231. See id. at 11–12 (discussing emails and communications 
between the traders that FERC argues together satisfy the joint scheme 
element).  
232.  See id. at 12 (describing a communication Levine sent before 
leaving for vacation asking co-workers to trade for her). 
233. See id. (“OE Staff presented evidence that shows Brin and 
Smith reversed Physical Positions to support Levine's request.”).  
234. See id. at 13 (“Respondents deny the existence of a pattern of 
building and flattening the Physical Positions to the benefit of the Financial 
Swaps.”).  
235. See id. at 14 (describing Barclays’ argument that its trading 
when taken as a whole does not constitute a pattern of fraudulent conduct). 
236.  See id. (“[T]he Commission declines the invitation to view the 
trade data in this ‘aggregated’ manner.”). 
237.  See id. (“The allegation . . . is that it was the physical markets 
at four nodes across 35 product months that were manipulated.”). 
238. See id. (“[T]he record in this case reflects a sustained and 
deliberate effort by Respondents first to build Physical Positions in a direction 
opposite to their Financial Swaps and then to flatten those Physical Positions in 
order to benefit the Financial Swaps.”). 
239. See id. at 15 (“The fact that Respondents’ trading may have 
been profitable on a particular day, or in a particular month, however, does not 
overcome the weight of evidence . . . .”).  
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FERC also rejects Barclays’ support for the position.240 FERC 
stresses that it considers all of the circumstances of the case to 
determine a violation.241 
 Barclays and its traders also attempt to disprove fraud 
through Barclays’ ex ante theory.242 Barclays and its traders 
assert that the individual traders could not have had the 
necessary confidence in the profitability of the swap positions to 
risk that the positions might be unprofitable.243 In essence, 
Barclays asserts that it is unlikely the traders would take such 
positions because they are too risky financially.244 FERC rejects 
this argument because the emails between the traders do not 
evidence concern about the profitability of their positions.245 
Additionally, FERC argues the emails reflect a misunderstanding 
because the traders do not know how buying or selling in large 
quantities impacts the market as a whole by taking trades from 
other companies.246 
  Barclays also asserted they could not have violated the 
anti-manipulation rule because the trades themselves were 
legal.247 FERC asserts the trades can violate the anti-
manipulation rule if legal trades are made with a manipulative 
                                                             
240. See id. (rejecting two Commission cases that Barclays asserted 
established that trades must be unprofitable to be a violation).  
241. See id. (“[T]he determination of fraud is based on all of the 
circumstances in the particular case before the Commission.”). 
242. See id. at 16–18 (describing Barclays’ ex ante theory and 
rejecting it).  
243. See id. at 16 (arguing no manipulation because “the benefit to 
the financial positions from manipulating the physical market could not have 
been anticipated . . . and thus the alleged behavior would be ‘irrational’ and the 
traders would lack ‘incentive’ to engage in those trades.”). 
244. See id. (“[T]he traders could not ‘reasonably believe’ that they 
would trade Dailies to enhance the Financial Swaps in such a manner as to 
result in an overall profit.”). 
245.  See id. at 17 (“[T]he communications among the traders 
themselves demonstrate that the traders understood that they were moving the 
Index to benefit Barclays' financial position.”). 
246. See id. (“Barclays wrongly assumes that its trading Dailies had 
no impact on other market participants.”). 
247.  See id. at 18 (“Specifically, Barclays states that it is not 
possible to defraud market participants in an open market ‘based solely on 




intent.248 FERC cites case authority stating that there is a 
difference between a legal transaction with and without the 
intent to manipulate a market.249 FERC asserted that the 
existence of the emails, unprofitable daily trading, and trading 
inconsistent with supply and demand of the market are enough to 
satisfy the fraud element of an anti-manipulation claim given an 
intent to manipulate the market.250 
 Having rejected Barclays’ and the traders’ arguments on 
the first element, FERC moved on to the scienter element251. 
Scienter requires knowing, intentional, or reckless misconduct.252 
FERC argues that this element is satisfied by the trader’s own 
emails, suspiciously timed transactions, transactions that 
benefitted derivative positions, and irrational economic 
conduct.253 FERC alleges that all the traders coordinated in a 
scheme to manipulate the market that they understood, expected 
to work, and intended to work.254 Barclays asserts that FERC 
must prove its interpretation of the emails and transactions in 
question, but FERC argues that because its prima facie case is 
met, Barclays has the burden to rebut the prima facie case and 
has not.255 FERC goes so far as to say that they do not believe 
                                                             
248. See id. at 19 (“A number of courts have recognized that 
transactions undertaken with manipulative intent, rather than a legitimate 
economic motive, send inaccurate price signals to the market . . . .”). 
249.  See id. at 18–19 (describing precedent that held lawful trades 
could be unlawful if undertaken with manipulative intent). 
250. See id. at 20 (listing the different pieces of evidence that FERC 
asserts establishes manipulation).  
251. See id. at 22 (outlining scienter as the second element 
necessary to establish a violation of the Anti-Manipulation Rule).  
252. See id. (“[S]cienter requires knowing, intentional, or reckless 
misconduct, as opposed to mere negligence.”).  
253.  See id. (stating scienter is satisfied because “emails and 
instant messages (IMs), suspicious timing or repetition of transactions, 
execution of transactions benefiting derivative positions, and lack of legitimate 
economic motive or economically irrational conduct”). 
254. See id. (stating the traders “understood how this scheme would 
work; that they expected it to work; that they intended it to work”). 
255. See id. (“[I]t is also true that Barclays bears the burden of 
rebutting OE Staff's allegations, including its interpretations of the emails and 
IMs after OE Staff establishes a prima facie case.”).  
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Barclays’ traders’ conduct was merely reckless but was 
intentional.256  
 To support its finding of scienter, FERC first asserts direct 
evidence.257 To combat the direct evidence, Barclays asserts that 
the evidence does not prove a manipulative scheme but only 
intent in specific instances that FERC cannot use to later claim 
an overall manipulative intent.258 Also, Barclays does not believe 
that FERC established a necessary connection between the 
documents it asserts to prove intent and manipulative 
transactions by traders.259 FERC believes it did establish a 
connection and that appropriate inferences will always be 
necessary to prove intent from direct evidence.260 
 FERC presents direct evidence with respect to each 
individual trader.261 First, with respect to Brin, FERC relies on 
instant message communications.262 In the communications, he 
tells a friend that his trading is to benefit the long-term positions 
that Conelly possesses.263 Barclays asserts that Brin did not have 
the knowledge to participate or design such a scheme, but FERC 
rejects that argument because of his explanation to his friend.264  
Second, FERC asserts direct evidence of Smith’s intent 
based on a November 3, 2006 instant message in which he 
                                                             
256. See id. at 23 (“We are satisfied that the scienter element is met 
here under even the most stringent definition of ‘recklessness’ because, as 
discussed elsewhere in this order, the evidence presented demonstrates that the 
conduct was not merely reckless, but intentional.”). 
257. See id. at 25 (discussing whether particular communications 
by the traders were directly linked to specific manipulative trades).  
258.  See id. (arguing that communications from specific periods of 
time in October 2006 and summer 2007 cannot be used to infer Barclays’ intent 
to go along with the entire scheme for the entire period of time).  
259. See id. (arguing that the FERC cannot establish a “nexus” 
between communications by the traders and resulting manipulative trades). 
260. See id. (stating that Supreme Court precedent assumes that 
inferences will be necessary to prove intent). 
261. See id. at 26–34 (outlining communications made by each 
trader that FERC believes proves manipulative intent).  
262. See id. at 26–27 (explaining that FERC submitted the instant 
message to establish Brin’s state of mind).  
263. See id. (describing instant messages between Brin and a friend 
discussing his abnormal trading).  
264. See id. at 27 (“Brin's November 30, 2006 IM exchange and the 
additional evidence presented by OE Staff establishes that Brin both understood 
the mechanics of the manipulative scheme alleged by OE Staff, and willingly 




bragged to another trader that he moved the index to a position 
more favorable to Barclays’ financial swap positions.265 Barclays 
attempts to argue that Smith engaged in boastful banter, but 
FERC believes his communication shows his direct intent to 
involve himself in the scheme.266  
Third, FERC asserts that Levine was a part of the scheme 
because she sent two emails to colleagues and an instant message 
to another trader, who are not charged with manipulating the 
market.267 Levine and Barclays argue that these communications 
are proof of her intent only if the manipulative scheme is 
assumed.268 In one communication, Levine states that one reason 
to trade a certain way is to protect a swap position.269 In two 
other communications, Levine requests that colleagues trading on 
her behalf attempt to trade in ways that would protect her 
financial swap positions.270 FERC rejects Levine and Barclays’ 
arguments that the communications do not display manipulative 
intent because Levine fails to supply any credible alternative 
explanation regarding the communications.271 
Fourth, FERC asserts that Connelly, the managing 
director of North American power trading, had the necessary 
scienter, arguing that three communications and suspect trading 
                                                             
265. See id. at 28 (describing an instant message in which Smith 
states that he messed with the market). 
266. See id. (“[H]is IM chatter, the evidence provides a direct 
window into his understanding of the manipulative scheme, even as he was in 
the process of implementing it.”). 
267. See id. at 29 (“Both Levine and OE Staff focus their arguments 
on the same five communications, but they interpret them in irreconcilable 
ways.”).  
268. See id. at 28 (arguing “that the communications cited by OE 
Staff contain ‘loose’ or ‘ambiguous’ language, but do not contain a 
straightforward admission of any of the elements of what OE Staffhas called the 
three-part scheme.”). 
269. See id. at 29 (“[T]he explanation that she offered . . . 
‘flattening’ a Physical Position rather than ‘protecting’ a Financial Swap 
position lacks credibility, because the broker had already suggested flattening a 
Physical Position as . . . possible explanations to which Levine added a third—
protecting a position.”). 
270. See id. (“[W]e view the October 11 IM exchange as an 
acknowledgement that the Respondents traded Index in order to protect the 
value of Barclays’ Financial Swap Positions.”). 
271. See id. at 30 (rejecting Levine’s arguments because she does 
not offer plausible explanations for her communications). 
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practices show Connelly’s intent. 272 The communications include 
instant messages where Connelly spurns the possibility of his 
trading being reported to FERC and an email published 
anonymously by The Friday Burrito when the newsletter 
questioned trading practices in power markets that involve 
moving the index.273 Barclays and Connelly attempt to argue that 
(1) the messages show that Connelly did not believe he could 
move the index much and (2) he chose to be published 
anonymously because he was not allowed to speak to the media 
on Barclays’ behalf.274 FERC claims that these arguments are 
inconsistent with Connelly’s position and emails.275 FERC further 
asserts that the individual traders were personally hired by 
Connelly and would not have acted without Connelly’s 
approval.276 FERC concluded its scienter argument by stating 
that the scienter of the individual traders should be attributed to 
Barclays.277 
 The final element requires that the action be taken in 
connection with a transaction subject to the Commission’s 
jurisdiction.278 FERC’s general grant of jurisdiction states that 
the Commission has authority over “the sale of electric energy at 
                                                             
272. See id. at 31 (“Barclays and Connelly argue that OE Staff has 
not established that Connelly acted with the requisite scienter in connection 
with the alleged manipulative scheme.”).  
273. See id. (“There are additional facts, communications, and trade 
data which demonstrate that Connelly understood the manipulative strategy 
that he both oversaw and personally implemented, and that directly contradict 
his current claims of ignorance of the scheme.”). 
274. See id. at 33 (“[A]ny alleged nefarious characterization of such 
a request was completely outweighed by the basic reason that he was not 
authorized to make public statements or representations to the media on behalf 
of Barclays.”). 
275. See id. at 34 (“We find that Connelly acted with actual intent. 
We also find that the evidence supports a finding that his conduct satisfies the 
lesser ‘recklessness’ standard, however stringently defined.”). 
276. See id. at 31 (“The Individual Traders—whom Connelly 
personally hired and had known for years—testified that they traded in 
Connelly's book and that they would not have done so without his knowledge 
and consent.”).  
277. See id. at 34 (“[W]e find that the knowing or reckless state of 
mind of the Individual Traders can and must be attributed to Barclays itself.”). 
278. See id at 35 (“The third element of establishing a violation of 
the Anti-Manipulation Rule is determining whether the conduct in question was 




wholesale in interstate commerce.”279 In addition, the statute that 
gives rise to the anti-manipulation rule grants authority over any 
entity that manipulates in connection with the purchase or sale 
of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.280 
Thus, FERC reasons that Barclays sold electric energy at 
wholesale within FERC’s grant of jurisdiction, and because the 
grant for the manipulation rule includes FERC’s general 
jurisdiction, Barclays is subject to FERC’s jurisdiction.281 
Barclays argues that FERC does not have authority over 
financially-settled-day-ahead transactions.282 Although FERC 
does not explicitly address Barclays’ argument, it contends that 
its aforementioned arguments prove FERC’s jurisdiction over the 
transactions.283 
 After considering the evidence, FERC agreed with its 
Office of Enforcement and analyzed the issue of whether to adopt 
the Office of Enforcement’s recommendation of civil penalties 
against Barclays of $435 million, Connelly for $15 million, Brin 
for $1 million, Levine for $1 million, Smith for $1 million, and 
disgorgement of unjust profits against Barclays of $34.9 
million.284 After considering the penalty minimums and 
maximums per the penalty guidelines, FERC decided that the 
Office of Enforcement’s recommended penalties for Barclays were 
appropriate.285 All of the individual traders argued that their 
                                                             
279. Id.  
280. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(v)(a) (2014) (“It shall be unlawful for any 
entity . . . to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of electric 
energy . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance . . . .”).  
281. See Order Assessing Civil Penalties, Docket No. IN08-8, 144 
FERC ¶ 61,041, 36 (July 16, 2013) (“Respondents traded ‘to affect’ an index 
‘which sets the price of both non-jurisdictional and jurisdictional transactions’ 
and, therefore, they are subject to the Commission's authority under section 222 
of the FPA and the Anti-Manipulation Rule.”).  
282. See id. at 35 (“Barclays claims that the Commission has no 
jurisdiction over what it describes as the ‘financially-settled day-ahead 
transactions’ at issue.”).  
283. See id. (reasoning that (1) FERC does have jurisdiction and (2) 
Barclays’ argument is not persuasive). 
284.  See id. at 48–49 (listing the penalties assessed against 
Barclays and the traders). 
285.  See id. at 41 (“After taking into consideration the two statutory 
factors of FPA section 316A in light of the evidence presented to us, we find that 
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penalties were not appropriate due to their financial status, but 
FERC rejected the arguments because of the gravity and nature 
of the offenses.286 Barclays disputed the Office of Enforcement’s 
disgorgement of profits calculation, but did not suggest a 
different figure.287 FERC decided $34.9 million was sufficient, 
and that the econometric evidence could be presented to a federal 
district judge.288 
 On October 9, 2013, FERC filed a petition to enforce the 
order in the Eastern District of California.289 This is the first 
FERC enforcement action that has reached the federal courts; 
accordingly, this action will likely address many significant 
issues.290 The federal court will review FERC’s factual and legal 
findings de novo.291 The case is pending on a Motion to Dismiss or 
Change Venue filed by Barclays along with a supporting brief.292 
FERC filed its opposition to both the Motion to Dismiss and 
                                                                                                                                             
the penalties recommended by OE Staff are authorized by statute, and 
appropriate to the conduct.”). 
286.  See id. at 42–46 (describing the traders’ arguments that the 
penalties assessed were disproportionate to their financial assets, in addition to 
FERC’s rejection of these contentions). 
287. See id. at 46 (“Barclays responds that the recommended 
disgorgement is ‘wholly inconsistent with the data available to Barclays’ but 
does not propose a different sum.”). 
288. See id. at 48 (“[I]n the absence of competing evidence presented 
to us concerning Barclays' profit from the scheme, we find that Barclays should 
disgorge $34.9 million in unjust profits, plus interest, from its manipulative 
scheme.”).  
289.  See Petition for an Order Affirming FERC’s July 16, 2013 
Order Assessing Penalties, FERC v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. CV-02093, 1 (E.D. 
Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (“Petitioner Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission . . . petitions this Court for an Order Affirming the Commission's 
Order Assessing Civil Penalties against Barclays Bank PLC . . . Daniel Brin, 
Scott Connelly, Karen Levine, and Ryan Smith . . . .”).  
290. See Fetty, supra note 8, at 2 (stating that because FERC is still 
developing its enforcement policies, every decision made regarding the rule will 
be important). 
291. See 16 U.S.C. § 823b(d)(3)(B) (2014) (“The court shall have 
authority to review de novo the law and the facts involved . . . .”).  
292. See generally Barclays Motion to Dismiss, FERC v. Barclays 
Bank PLC, 2013 WL 7045799 (Dec. 16, 2013) (E.D.Cal.) [hereinafter Barclays 
Brief] (requesting the court either dismiss the case or change venue to the 




Change of Venue on February 14.293 The Motion is set for hearing 
on April 24, 2014.294 
 
VI. Current Posture of the Barclays’ Case 
 
Barclays is the first entity to take FERC to federal court 
after being penalized under the market manipulation rule.295 
This section analyzes some of the issues the Barclays case may 
decide. Barclays Motion to Dismiss raises several important 
issues that are answered in FERC’s opposition motion: (1) 
whether FERC has jurisdiction over the transactions at issue 
under Hunter v. FERC,296 (2) whether the phrase “any entity” 
includes individuals,297 and (3) whether FERC has stated a claim 
under the SEC’s 10b-5 precedent.298 An important issue that 
Barclays reserved for later in the case is whether FERC has 
enough evidence to prove that its traders acted with intent to 
manipulate the market.299  
The first argument is that FERC does not have 
jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act over the types of trades 
made by Barclays.300 This is particularly important in light of the 
D.C. Circuit Court’s recent ruling in Hunter, which held that the 
                                                             
293. See Petitioner’s Opposition, FERC v. Barclays Bank PLC, 2014 
WL 988138, at *8–9 (Feb. 14, 2014) [hereinafter FERC Brief] (requesting that 
Barclays’ motion be denied in full). 
294. See Barclays Brief, 2013 WL 7045799 at *1 (stating the case is 
set for hearing April 24).  
295. See id. at *22 (arguing that the CFTC has exclusive 
jurisdiction over accounts, agreements, options, and transactions involving 
contracts to sell commodities for future delivery, traded or executed on a 
contract market or any other board of trade, exchange, or market) (citing 7 
U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2014)). 
296. See id. at *21 (“As the court of appeals made clear in Hunter, 
the CFTC’s anti-manipulation authority over futures contracts is exclusive.”); 
See generally Hunter v. FERC, 711 F.3d 155 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
297. See id. at *22 (“The plain meaning of the term ‘entity’ does not 
include natural persons.”).  
298. See id. at *26 (arguing that FERC has not stated a 
manipulation claim). 
299. See id. at *34 n.56 (“[A]ll other objections to the manipulation 
claim not raised in this Motion, including lack of intent to deceive, are reserved 
to be raised later if this action survives this Motion.”).  
300. See id. at *41 (“The Hunter case explains why FERC has no 
jurisdiction to pursue its claims against Defendants in this case.”). 
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CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over commodities futures 
contracts.301 Barclays argues that the trades at issue are under 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC.302 If the case is dismissed 
on this ground, it would be another significant blow to the 
breadth of FERC’s jurisdiction. 
Second, Barclays argues that “entity” in the anti-
manipulation statute does not include individuals, and thus, 
FERC cannot penalize the individual traders.303 Barclays argues 
that the plain meaning of the term “entity” does not include 
natural persons.304 The resolution of this issue will set important 
precedent because FERC could not assess penalties against 
individual traders if the court determines that individuals are not 
covered in the statute. 305  
Third, Barclays argues that the complaint does not state a 
claim of market manipulation.306 Citing precedent from the 
Supreme Court and Circuit Courts of Appeal, Barclays contends 
that FERC has not alleged manipulative conduct.307 If the case is 
dismissed on this ground, regulated entities will have their first 
example of how courts will apply rule 10b-5 precedents to FERC 
cases. 
An issue that Barclays did not explicitly raise in its brief, 
but reserved for the future, is the intent element of 
                                                             
301. See Hunter, 711 F.3d at 159 (“[I]f a scheme, such as 
manipulation, involves buying or selling commodity futures contracts, 
CEA section 2(a)(1)(A) vests the CFTC with jurisdiction to the exclusion of other 
agencies.”).  
302. See Barclays Brief, supra note 292, 2013 WL 7045799 at *21 
(“[T]he CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the alleged manipulative 
scheme . . . .”).  
303. See id. at *50 (“The FPA only permits FERC to regulate the 
manipulative acts of entities, 
such as businesses and organizations.”).  
304. See id. at *22 (“The plain meaning of the term “entity” does not 
include natural persons.”). 
305. See id. at *50 (arguing that because FERC’s regulation of 
manipulative activities is limited to entities, the claims against Mr. Brin, Mr. 
Connelly, Ms. Levine, and Mr. Smith should be dismissed).  
306. See id. at *22 (“[T]he Complaint fails to state a claim and 
should be dismissed as a matter of law.”).  
307. See id. at *54 (“There is a complete absence of allegations of 
manipulative conduct, as defined by the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, 




manipulation.308 In the Barclays case—especially in the context of 
the traders’ emails—FERC infers intent from emails or instant 
messages.309 Barclays may try to persuade the court or jury that 
FERC’s inferences are insufficient to establish manipulative 
intent.310 Given FERC’s strong reliance on the traders’ intent, 
Barclays may believe that a judge will not see the intent FERC 
relies on to prove both the intent and fraud elements. FERC has 
already stated that the transactions taken by the traders 
themselves could be legal without manipulative intent.311 Thus, if 
Barclays can disprove intent, the case may have to be dismissed. 
For example, trader Karen Levine argues that to prove 
intent against her, the prima facie case must be assumed.312 The 
emails she sent are not overtly manipulative; she did not instruct 
anyone to trade uneconomically to protect her financial swaps.313 
In the instant message FERC relies on, Levine offers an alternate 
explanation to a question about trading.314 She does not state 
which explanation is the correct one.315 Accordingly, it may be 
difficult for FERC to convince a court or jury that an alternate 
explanation in an instant message and email, asking colleagues 
to try trade a certain way, proves intent to manipulate a market.  
 
                                                             
308. See id. at n.56 (“[A]ll other objections to the manipulation 
claim not raised in this Motion, including lack of intent to deceive, are reserved 
to be raised later if this action survives this Motion.”).  
309. See Order Assessing Civil Penalties, Docket No. IN08-8, 144 
FERC ¶ 61,041, 15 (July 16, 2013) (stating that because Levine did not include 
any mention of uncertainty in the profitability of financial swaps, that she was 
sure, and part of the scheme).  
310.  See Barclays Brief, supra note 292, 2013 WL 7045799 at n.56 
(reserving the right to attack the FERC for “the lack of sufficient allegations of 
an intent to deceive.”). 
311. See Order Assessing Civil Penalties, Docket No. IN08-8, 144 
FERC ¶ 61,041, 19 (July 16, 2013) (stating that the difference between a legal 
trade and an illegal one is intent). 
312. See id. at 28 (“Levine herself contends that the only way the 
cited communications could be construed as evincing manipulative intent is if 
the existence of the manipulative scheme is already presupposed . . . .”).  
313. See id. at 30–31 (arguing that although Levine did not spell 
out in her email why her trading instructions furthered the manipulative 
scheme, her emails furthered the scheme anyway). 
314. See id. at 29 (arguing that Levine’s addition of an alternate 
reason to trade their shows she had manipulative intent).  
315. See id. at 29 (arguing that Levine was not referencing Barclays 
at all in her instant message).  
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VII. Factors for Determining Whether to Force FERC into 
Federal Court  
 
 There are many different factors a regulated entity should 
consider before deciding whether to take its case into federal 
court.316 These factors include: (1) timing of the entity’s 
cooperation; (2) whether the company self-reported; and (3) the 
size of a potential fine.317 
As an initial matter, it is useful to consider why FERC 
agrees to settlements. One reason FERC is willing to reduce fines 
is because it believes that settlements are in the interest of public 
policy.318 Settlements allow FERC to sequester ongoing violations 
and unjust profits.319 For example, FERC does not accept 
mitigating factors for unjust profits because the harm has 
already occurred.320 A regulated entity should consider whether 
there are ongoing violations, and unjust profits derived from such 
violations, when assessing how to approach a FERC 
investigation.321 If the entity knows that the violations and unjust 
                                                             
316. See October Policy Statement, Docket No. PL06-01, 113 FERC 
¶ 61,068, 61,243 (October 20, 2005) (“Our purpose is to provide firm but fair 
enforcement of our rules and regulations and to place entities subject to our 
jurisdiction on notice of the consequences of violating the statutes, orders, rules, 
and regulations we enforce.”). 
317. See id. (“In discussing the factors we will take into account in 
determining the severity of penalties . . . for violations, we also recognize the 
importance of demonstrable compliance and cooperation efforts by utilities, 
natural gas companies, and other entities subject to the statutes, orders, rules, 
and regulations administered by the Commission.”). 
318. See May Policy Statement, Docket No. PL08-3, 123 FERC ¶ 
61,156, 62,013 (May 15, 2008) (“[T]he public interest is often better served 
through settlements . . . .”). 
319. See id. (“[W]e are able to ensure that compliance problems are 
remedied faster and that disgorged profits may be returned to customers 
faster . . . .”).  
320. See October Policy Statement, Docket No. PL06-01, 113 FERC 
¶ 61,068, 61,247 (October 20, 2005) (“[A]t a minimum a company involved in 
wrongdoing must disgorge any unjust profits resulting from the wrongdoing.”).  
321.  See id. at 61,249 (“The manner in which a company 
approaches cooperation will be an important factor in determining whether, and 




profits have ceased, it may predict FERC’s sanctions more 
easily.322 
Another initial question is whether the company self-
reported.323 Self-reporting may show that the company has a 
strong commitment to compliance.324 This commitment fosters 
the belief that the company is trying to comply with FERC 
regulations in good faith, which may permit a reduction in 
fines.325 However, if the company did not self-report, that will 
affect two different factors that FERC uses to assess penalties: (1) 
there will be no argument that the entity self-reported, and (2) 
the entity will have a difficulty arguing for a strong culture of 
compliance if it cannot find its own mistakes.326 
Once the Office of Enforcement has determined that a 
violation occurred, a company loses one of its incentives to settle 
quickly and quietly.327 Because the Commission counts 
settlements that occur before trial proceedings as prior 
adjudications, regulated entities do not have an incentive to 
settle quickly to benefit them in future proceedings.328 The impact 
of a settlement on the regulated entity is that its compliance will 
                                                             
322.  See id. (“The factors discussed in this Policy Statement 
provide guidance to the industry on the approach we will take to future 
enforcement.”). 
323.  See id. at 61,247 (“We place great importance on self-
reporting. Companies are in the best position to detect and correct violations of 
our orders, rules, and regulations . . . and should be proactive in doing so.”). 
324. See May Policy Statement, Docket No. PL08-3, 123 FERC ¶ 
61,156, 62,019 (May 15, 2008) (“We also place great value on self-reporting, 
particularly when it points to a strong compliance program.”). 
325. See id. (“We . . . will maintain our practice of awarding penalty 
credit for parties that promptly self-report violations, assuming such conduct is 
not negated by a poor compliance culture.”). 
326. See id. (“[S]elf-reporting is no substitute for a strong 
compliance program . . . .”). 
327. See September Policy Statement, Docket No. PL10-4, 132 
FERC ¶ 61,216, 62,140(Sept. 17, 2010) (“We generally consider that an 
organization’s efforts to achieve or maintain compliance with our requirements 
should not be the basis for an offset to or reduction in the penalty amount for a 
violation because the organization should have been in compliance before the 
violation.”). 
328. See id. at 62,141 (“The Commission considers prior settlements 
for purposes of considering an organization's prior history and we will continue 
to do so under the Penalty Guidelines.”). 
6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 1 (2014) 242 
not be as highly regarded in future actions.329 If the regulated 
entity committed any violation against FERC or any other agency 
in the past ten years, its compliance score will be higher than if it 
had no prior adjudications.330 Because of the impact on future 
proceedings, a regulated entity should consider settling with 
FERC before the proceeding counts as a prior adjudication.331 
In their October Policy Statement, FERC states that it 
will account for cooperative conduct when assessing penalties.332 
Therefore, a regulated entity should consider whether their fine 
reduction from cooperation makes paying the total fine cheaper 
than the cost of litigation.333 The September Policy Statement 
states that there could be a significant reduction in the penalty 
assessed or no penalty at all;334a ninety-five percent reduction is 
possible.335 Cooperation is available even if the company did not 
self-report.336 However, uncooperative conduct is also taken into 
account.337 Additionally, a firm that will receive a small fine may 
get it reduced to zero.338  
                                                             
329. See id. (deciding that prior history will be used on a case-by-
case basis and may indicate a lack of commitment to compliance). 
330. See id. at 62,137 (“[A]n organization's culpability score 
increases by one point if there was a Commission adjudication of any violation 
less than ten years earlier or if there was an adjudication of similar misconduct 
by any other enforcement agency.”).  
331.  See id. at 62,141 (“The Commission considers prior 
settlements for purposes of considering an organization's prior history and we 
will continue to do so under the Penalty Guidelines.”). 
332. See October Policy Statement, Docket No. PL06-01, 113 FERC 
¶ 61,068, 61,243 (October 20, 2005) (“[W]e also recognize the importance of 
demonstrable compliance and cooperation efforts . . . .”). 
333. See Fetty, supra note 8 (discussing an entity that chose to 
litigate against FERC after receiving a $415 million fine). 
334. See September Policy Statement, Docket No. PL10-4, 132 
FERC ¶ 61,216, 62,133 (Sept. 17, 2010) (discussing the benefits of compliance 
under the penalty guidelines). 
335. See id. (“[A]n effective compliance program could result in a 
ninety-five percent reduction in penalties when combined with other factors.”).  
336.  See October Policy Statement, Docket No. PL06-01, 113 FERC 
¶ 61,068, 61,248 (October 20, 2005) (“[T]he Commission will consider these 
factors even for entities that did not self-report violations, provided that 
cooperation was provided once the violation was uncovered.”). 
337. See id. (“Lack of cooperation is a serious matter and will be 
weighed in deciding appropriate remedies.”).  
338. See id. (“[P]rompt and full self-reporting of violations, coupled 
with steps to correct the adverse impact on customers or third parties from the 




 A final factor to consider is that FERC has authority to file 
in the jurisdiction of its choice depending on how broadly a court 
is willing to read “the appropriate court” language of Section 
31(d)(3)(B).339 The energy markets that Barclays allegedly 
manipulated were in California, and FERC may believe that a 




 The value of the Barclays enforcement proceeding itself is 
immense. When decided, it will be the only precedent for 
regulated entities to determine how a federal court will 
administer the anti-manipulation rule. With FERC rapidly 
increasing its number of enforcement actions and the amount of 
the fines levied, regulated entities will intently analyze the 
outcome of this case.341  
Looking at the factors, there are two types of actions that 
benefit from immediate cooperation with the agency and two 
types of actions that benefit from litigation in federal court.342 A 
regulated entity that receives an enormous fine on evidence it 
believes is weak, like Barclays, and an entity receiving what it 
believes is an entirely unwarranted fine, might take FERC to 
court.343 However, regulated entities that believe they can settle 
                                                             
339. See 16 U.S.C. § 823b (2014) (“[T]he Commission shall institute 
an action in the appropriate district court of the United States for an order 
affirming the assessment of the civil penalty.”) 
340. See Barclays Brief, supra note 292, 2013 WL 7045799 at *2. 
(“[T]his District is convenient and also has a powerful interest in this matter as 
it involves Respondents’ manipulation of electricity markets in and around this 
District.”). 
341. See October Policy Statement, Docket No. PL06-01, 113 FERC 
¶ 61,068, 61,246 (October 20, 2005) (explaining that FERC wants to develop a 
consistent approach to levying penalties in cases of analogous misconduct, 
“taking all relevant factors into account.”). 
342.  See id. at 61,244 (“The proposed regulations will provide . . . 
for imposition of civil penalties. It is therefore important that we articulate how 
we intend to apply our new . . . civil penalty authority . . . to assure the industry 
that we will temper strong enforcement measures with consideration of . . . 
mitigating factors, in determining the appropriate remedies.”). 
343. See 16 U.S.C. § 823b(d)(3)(B) (2014) (demonstrating that 
because regulated entities only have 60 days to pay fines, it may be 
economically beneficial, in terms of legal fees, to litigate winnable cases against 
FERC instead of hastily paying and assuming fault).  
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for a small financial penalty and entities that are aware of strong 
evidence against them, like JP Morgan, should cooperate to 
significantly reduce their penalty.344 
                                                             
344. See October Policy Statement, Docket No. PL06-01, 113 FERC 
¶ 61,068, 61,247 (October 20, 2005) (explaining that compliance and cooperation 
may drastically lower an entity’s penalty).  
